



## HobbesOn Private Property, Freedom and Order<sup>1</sup>

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### Abstract

The main aim of this article is to examine how and why the tension stemmed from economic inequalities and dependence arising from private ownership of the means of production are alleviated and legitimated by Hobbesian social contract theory. In this respect, the study chiefly concentrates on one important point which is to evaluate the modern-term social contract theory developed by Thomas Hobbes by linking it to the emergence process of the capitalist relations. More importantly, the study applies a methodological approach which underlines main material and social conditions of a given period in which Hobbes has lived. As a result of this approach the paper hypothesizes that description of the notions of 'state of nature' and 'human nature' as contractarian methodological tools in Hobbes' social contract theory aim at theorizing a social formation in which the tension between private property and freedom is lessened or eliminated for the sake of property owners of the means of production.

**Keywords:** Thomas Hobbes, Private Property, Freedom, Order

### Introduction

Theoretically speaking, modern-term social contract theory or model emerged as a consensus among rational human beings work as a methodological tool that regulates the relations between state, society, and individual. It has an important methodological content, for it forms both how modern state emerges and how concepts such as freedom, justice, and equality in the axis of individual, society, and state are formulated. In this regard, modern social contract theories, which are the early examples of the individualistic theory that explains the emergence of political and civil society based on individual consent in the history of political thought, are at the same time early samples of defining a social formation in which the relation between private property and freedom is formulated (Baucher and Kelly, 1994: 103). One of the modern social contract theories of the seventeenth century have been developed by Thomas Hobbes during the emergence of agrarian capitalist production in England. Although Hobbesian social contract theory include hypothetical contents, examining the historical, social and material conditions of the period that it has been developed is important to demonstrate what the role it has played in building a new political and economic order. Before anything else, it can be claimed that it was the emergence of capitalism as a mode of production in England which upside down the society that has enabled Hobbes to use contractarian tools in terms of solving social and economic inequalities by means of formulating and theorizing an order. In this sense, the social contract theory developed by Hobbes do not only pave the way for determining what the main premises of a state as an order constructor are but also do shed light on how the relationship between private property, freedom, and order ought to be formulated. In this way Hobbes does put forward the following argument: 'Since it is highly reasonable to share qualitative of freedoms among individuals in different levels in civil society, freedoms that are directly related to the notion of possessing property are among one of the first tasks to be guaranteed by the order (Hobbes, 1985: 67).

Notably, contrary to common assessment in literature which claims that Hobbes is just a pure theoretician of monarchy against bourgeoisie parliamentary-based order, it can be said that, as Russell Hardin argues, the roots of liberal thought are found in Hobbes's highly illiberal (non-liberal) views (1999: 17). Therefore, it should be noted that the monarch described by Hobbes here is quite different from the usual arguments supporting pure traditional royalists' argument like 'Robert Filmer's argument'<sup>2</sup>.

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Rather than the traditional monarchy whose power is justified through blood and ancestry ties, Hobbesian formulation of monarchy obtains its legitimacy from reason-based natural laws. Furthermore, it is noteworthy to say that such a monarchic system is equipped with civil laws derived from natural laws that are free from traditional laws and functional in ensuring the security of the capitalist market. By following this pre-acceptance this paper hypothesizes that description of the notions of 'state of nature' and 'human nature' as contractarian methodological tools in Hobbes' social contract theory aim at theorizing a social formation in which the tension between private property and freedom is lessened or eliminated for the sake of property owners of the means of production. In other words, this paper claims that by using the designs of 'state of nature' and 'human nature' as methodological tools Hobbesian way of building a social formation aims at legitimating artificial inequalities and dependences stemmed from private ownership over means of production during the emergence process of agrarian capitalism. To this aim, the article principally consists of three parts. In the first part of the study the material and social conditions of seventeenth century of England is underlined very briefly by utilising specifically from the masterpieces of Marxism inspired historians in order to put Hobbes into right place. In the second part, Hobbesian designs of 'state of nature' and 'human nature' are clearly pointed out in order to clarify how Hobbes makes a connection between private property, freedom and order. And lastly; in the third part of the study the hypothesis of the article is tested in the lights of the arguments put forward in the first and second parts of the study.

### **Some Notes on Historical and Material Conditions of Seventeenth Century in terms of Putting Hobbes into the Right Place: Transition from Feudal Order to Capitalism**

In his prominent book called *The Age of Revolution* Eric Hobsbawm asserts that the Glorious Revolution has changed the face of the whole world, especially of Europe (1962: 12). Likewise, the Medieval European historians, Agibalova and Donskoy, argue that the origin of the concepts of contemporary political order, liberty, and equality in Europe must be sought in the seventeenth century of Britain (1998: 128). By taking this great historical event into consideration one should ask the question of 'what were the main reasons of Glorious Revolution which shaped the whole world-order for decades?' which unavoidably enables us to shed light on radical changes taken place in social and economic spectrums of the English Society during the eve of Glorious Revolution which Hobbes has experienced. Obviously, to explain main reasons of the shift from feudal order to capitalist order during the eve of Glorious Revolution needs explaining many parameters which will be beyond the scope of this article. Nonetheless, some critical descriptive points can help us to understand the material and social conditions of the period in which Hobbes has lived.

The paramount feature of the feudal period emerged at a time when, as Marc Bloch states, the notion of central state was deeply weakened and in particular completely inadequate in protecting its residents (1975: 164). By the same token, according to historian Gianfranco Poggi who writes about the historical origin and development of modern nation-state the emergence of feudalism in the West was based on two major developments which were 'the collapse of the centralized government and the dissolution of communication and trade route' in Western Europe (1978: 18). On this account, he argues that since feudalism has emerged in an environment where the confusion and insecurity of central power have disappeared as well as trade has almost ceased and the importance of urban life has been lost, the basic determinant of the economy which also mostly determined political structure in the last instance was based on agricultural production (Ibid: 20). More significantly, Perry Anderson describes the feudal economy as a mode of production under the dominance of land and as an economic structure in which neither of labour nor the products of labour was commoditized (1978: 147).

The feudal mode of production also reflects a kind of social stratification originating from property relations. Once the land was regarded as a basic means of production in such a system church and feudal lords, which/who had a large scale of land, were at the top in the hierarchical structure in society while the serfs, who had almost no land ownership, were located in the lower part of the social layer. More importantly, the formation of social classes in the feudal system, as Sydney Herbert claims, has emerged as a result of private property in land (1920; 7). Senior mansions, in this sense, were at the same time indicator of private farming enterprises in feudal order. In general, one-third or one-four of these enterprises were assigned to the private farming, while the remaining parts were given to the peasants attached to the land (Beaud, 2001: 25). In such a feudal mode of production it is unsurprised to mention that the senators had the right to arbitrarily save on their incomes as well as the right to increase exploitation on serfs.

As far as the legal system of the feudal order is concerned it can be claimed that the legal aspect of the feudal system which based on justifying exploitation has been guaranteed by one of the superstructural tool, namely by feudal law. In this respect, serfs were legally obliged to work in the seigniors' lands in order to survive. The fact that the terms and conditions of employment were being set by land owner year by year at the same time indicates how serfs were exploited and became semi-slave. Hobsbawm depicts this situation of dependence and exploitation stemmed from private property based law by stating that if the serf was escaped from the land, the senior would have the right to find serf and judge him which was seen as a natural consequence of private property-based legitimate law (1962: 82).

Therefore, political and legal relations arising on the feudal mode of production not only in England but also across Europe can be summarized as a struggle for the surrender of surplus-value produced by 'land-dependent peasant/serf system' in which political power is fragmented among local authorities. In this sense, as Agibalova and Donskoy argue, the struggle between church and feudal lords in confiscating the surplus value produced by serfs thus constitutes the political struggle of almost all medieval times (1988: 97). Having been expressed briefly the main features of the feudal system above, it is plain to say that the feudal mode of production based on land ownership has led to strict social stratification and certain privileged classes during the feudal period of England, as well. Generally speaking, in such a feudal order it is obvious to point out that while two classes as oppressor subjects have obtained political and legal privileges, one class, namely serfs, who produced surplus value, were oppressed subjects. In other words, the feudal mode of production has shaped the main structure of economic, political, and legal aspects of the feudal order. While nobles (nobles, counties, barons, viscounts, knights) and priests (church and papal organizations) were the most privileged class of feudal Europe who had political, economic and judicial rights formulated by legal system, the serfs who were exploited by church and nobles were the most oppressed class of the feudal system, even though they were the foremost producers of surplus-value in feudal economic structure.

### **The Development of Agrarian Capitalism and Its Impacts on Feudal Social Formation in England**

In the sixteenth century, feudal order was about to collapse in Britain due to the capitalist relations that began to come to the surface in both cities and rural areas. The capitalization process, as Hobsbawm points out, began with the looting of overseas colonies which increased trade-based mobility in cities and with Fencing Process in rural areas which led to an extraordinary accumulation of capital and to the emergence of the bourgeois class in England (1962: 83). Hobsbawm's description of the process of dissolution of feudal order in England allows one to reach a conclusion that important elements in the settlement of capitalism in England are the spread of agrarian capitalism based on land ownership and accumulation of capital that has emerged by means of colonialism in abroad and trade in cities of England. More importantly, the assessment of the land as a commodity which emerged in parallel with the emergence process of agrarian capitalism indicates one of the other important points of understanding the development of Agrarian Capitalism. In this context, as Christopher Hill points out, regarding land as a commodity necessarily led to the acquisition of more land for sheep breeding, which raised the appetite of large landowners who were one of the actors of establishing capitalist mode of production during the process of transition to agrarian capitalism in England (1968: 181). Commodification of lands also led to increasing of manufacturing facilities in the cities and so to arise in excessive wool demand as well as demands for large grasslands for sheep breeding; that was why the peasants were removed by large landowners. More importantly, broad grasslands were needed for sheep breeding that was why landowners confiscated grassland grazing areas and banned the villagers' grazing there during this process called as Fencing Process (Harman, 2008: 210). What did this mean? It meant that as sheep breeding and wool fabrication have long been a major source of income for bourgeoisie class the importance of possessing land arose at a point where the alliance between bourgeoisie and new land owners clinched in England.

Therefore, the changes in feudal economic relations some important points of which mentioned above led to transformations and changes in many areas of the society in terms of emerging new classes as well. In Southeast England, for instance, the peasants grew a long-lived herd of sheep and wool in the rest of their free time in agriculture. Simple wools curved at home offered to sell in the nearest market which led to the emergence of a new kind of labourer (Hobsbawm, 1962: 95). Besides, wool fabrication system led other types of labourers and petty bourgeoisie. Hobsbawm narratively describes the process of agrarian capitalist mode of production in England by especially underlining the importance of the role of wool fabrication stemmed from sheep breeding in lands. He writes that:

(...) the twisted wool yarn were given to the weaving fabrics first, and then traders were selling the final fabric in the town or bringing it to the ports for export... In order to train the traders' orders, the poor peasants working in their homes paid little. Many of them work in looms belonging to merchants, often hundreds of peasant spinners and weavers seem to work for a single trader that is why the poor peasants, who pay for wool, looms and sweatshops to handle the merchant, have gradually turned into wage laborers..." (Ibid: 208).

Correspondingly, Karl Marx identifies the causal point of the emergence of the agrarian capitalism in England as Fencing System that leads to social injustice and re-shaping of social formation (Marx, 2015: 59). On this account, he identifies Fencing Process with an attack on the common assets of common capital in the English countryside. The fencing of common meadows and pastures in the English countryside, that is, the subjugation of private property, has vital importance in terms of the development of capitalism according to Marx. Therefore, the name of the commodification of nature, that is to say, the land, is indeed a kind of primitive accumulation (Ibid: 59). Moreover, once the situation of the Yeomans who were petty landlord peasants is considered, the sociological and economic dimensions of the Fencing System becomes more visible. The collapse of landlord peasants, namely Yeomans due to dispossession policy carried out by local governors backed by the Parliament, namely Cabinet of Lords, during the early period of the seventeenth-century of England specifies how Yeomans had to emigrate from their homelands to the big cities in order to find a job for surviving (Ibid: 24).

The sociological changes caused by development of Agrarian Capitalism and Fencing Process can be examined in Table (A) in the sense that how the emergence process of capitalism has led to the emergence of new social classes during civil war in the eve of Glorious Revolution which Hobbes has witnessed.

Given that, when the social positions of landless peasants and beggars indicated in the table are taken into consideration it is palpable to comprehend why there was a conflictual atmosphere in the seventeenth-century of England in this respect. Tens of thousands of peasants expelled from their lands have been forced to leave from common public pasture to cities where they became beggars and outcasts. This meant that the peasants would lose their feudal bonds and gain their 'so-called liberties'. As far as the material condition of petty merchants is considered it is plain to say that there were still few workshops in the towns but only one shepherd was enough in the mansions where a dozen peasant families worked. More importantly, these changes in social structure due to the new relations of production have transformed "free peasants" into beggars as well. Tragically and ironically, the deaths of thousands of so-called free but propertyless peasants due to hunger and diseases in cities indicates how agrarian capitalism led to a new social formation in England during the middle of the seventeenth century. In other words, the new social formation of England during civil war tells us that besides the feudal classes and new landlords/land aristocracy, the development of agrarian capitalism and the economic strengthening of the bourgeois class in the city led to the emergence of so-called free peasants, or beggars, instead of the serfs, who lived in the feudal state of the land and was somehow able to feed his own family and his own stomach.

### **Thomas Hobbes: On State of Nature, Human Nature and State in which the Relation between Property and Freedom is Formulated**

Since the description of the state of nature is directly related to how the notion of human nature is defined in Hobbes theory, Hobbesian description of 'state of nature' inevitably includes basic features of human nature, as well. When Hobbes' argument concerning the state of nature is examined it is plain to say that people in the state of nature have dresses, houses, and some weapons, namely personal belongings, even though they are at a primitive level. Hobbes describes this stage of nature as follows:

In such condition there is no place for industry, because the fruit thereof is uncertain: and consequently no culture of the earth; no navigation, nor use of the commodities that may be imported by sea; no commodious building; no instruments of moving and removing such thing as require much more; no knowledge of the face of the earth; no account of time; no arts; no letters; no society (1997: 78).

In Hobbes' theory of state of nature and human nature, which portrays a modern materialistic and individualistic state of nature, people are born in equality and have infinite freedom. However, this freedom formulated by Hobbes is extremely dangerous, since Hobbesian depiction of static human nature is based on two major features attributed to human nature which are 'selfish' and 'warlike'. Accordingly, human beings' basic impulses of passion and pleasure to drive the human pursuit of the people, according to Hobbes, inevitably succumb to their selfish nature (Ibid: 86). In such a state of nature man is described by Hobbes as man's wolf or so commonly used as 'homo hominilupus'<sup>3</sup>. Since there is no sovereign power in the state of nature which might prevent people's possible aggression against each other, the equality and freedom of people indeed might lead to war. In other words, as François Tricaud points out, since people are not moral beings in Hobbesian description of state of nature where there is no sovereign power, freedom of people may lead to immoral acts in terms of infringing other people's basic natural rights (1990: 108). Hence, Hobbes does not define this kind of freedom in the state of nature as moral or real freedom (Ibid: 109). In other words, in the state of nature in which chaos and fear of death dominate individuals' life the fact that individuals are completely free is not a kind of freedom that Hobbes regards as positive, because, Hobbes, as Tom Sorell underlines, calls this kind of freedom as 'useless freedom' (2004: 185). That is, the behaviours of individuals with unlimited freedom are so vulnerable that easily might lead to a 'state of war', since selfish and warlike individuals are equal and free in order to obtain power against each other in Hobbesian state of nature. More importantly, in state of nature, to Hobbes, people have equal opportunity in terms of using their body and mind to survive, although they appear physically unequal. Hobbes, in this sense, writes that;

Nature hath made men so equal in the faculties of body and mind as that, though there be found one man sometimes manifestly stronger in body or of quicker mind than another, yet when all is reckoned together the difference between man and man is not so considerable as that one man can thereupon claim to himself any benefit to which another may not pretend as well as he. For as to the strength of body, the weakest has strength enough to kill the strongest, either by secret machination or by confederacy with others that are in the same danger with himself (1997: 76).

By continuing same logic Hobbes claims that the equality and freedom of individuals in terms of obtaining anything on nature leads to the enmity among individuals, for "if any two men desire the same thing, which nevertheless they cannot both enjoy, they become enemies; and in the way to their end (which is principally their own conservation, and sometimes their delectation only) endeavour to destroy or subdue one another" (Ibid). The important point that can be drawn from this Hobbesian description of the emergence of enmity among individuals in state of nature is the reality of scarce resources in nature which highly possibly lead to the enmity. In such a state of nature, for Hobbes, three principles lead to the state of war which are: "First competition; secondly, diffidence; thirdly, glory" (Ibid: 77). So, according to Hobbes, if there is no sovereign power over individuals, morality and so moral freedom will not be in question. Man is not a man who can act morally in spite of his instinct to protect his existence in such a state of nature. Hence, the only place where morality and moral liberty will begin to find an application begins in a place where state emerges. That is, in state of nature everyone will be always at war all against all unless there is a sovereign power, namely state. Hobbes thus describes the state of nature as a circumstance in which man's life is "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short" (Ibid: 78). In other words, when individuals live without a general power to fear them all, they are indeed in a state of war, and this war is the war of all against all (Ibid: 94). Hobbes, who regards human beings as not social and political beings in the state of nature or as not *zoon politikon* in Aristotelian sense (Ibid: 22), believes that human being in state of nature is an 'anti-social and rational based on selfishness' which also led to the first type of atomistic liberal individuality or unencumbered-self imagination of individual. Moreover, since neither society is natural phenomenon and voluntary regulation nor is there a natural force bringing people together, what is intended in terms of constructing a social order in state of nature is something that seems to be good for all members of the society. Hence, what drives people to establish a social order is not mutual affection according to Hobbes. Rather, it is mutual fear of man's present and future that brings them together, since the cause of fear among people lies partly in the natural equality between them and partly in the desire to harm each other in the state of nature (Ibid: 24-25).

As far as the notion of private property in Hobbesian description of the state of nature is concerned, Hobbes styles that it is not possible to talk about private property rights in the state of nature, since in the state of nature everyone has equal rights over everything, even if the things on nature are acquired by labour (Abramson, in Demirci, 2016: 409).

To put it in a different way, there is not the right to private property in Hobbesian formulation of state of nature, since, as Richard Schlatter notes “all men have a right to everything, it is impossible to conceive of this political authority as protecting men’s natural rights to property” (1951: 140). Hence, it can be concluded that one of the main necessities of constructing state as order founder in Hobbes’s theory is to guarantee an individual’s private property right, as Hobbes puts it;

Seeing therefore the introduction of propriety is an effect of Commonwealth, which can do nothing but by the person that represents it, it is the act of only of the sovereign; and consisteth in the laws, which none can make that have not the sovereign power (1997: 152).

More specifically, Hobbes considers that the right to property can be violated by the sovereign only in order to establish security. However, Hobbes puts an annotation to this situation. That is, except maintaining security if any property rights of individuals are violated by the sovereign that will mean that the will of individuals are ignored by Leviathan owing to the fact that Leviathan acts in contrast to the natural law and so natural reason, as he puts it:

For seeing the sovereign, that is to say, the commonwealth, (whose person he representeth), is understood to do nothing but in order to the common peace and security, this distribution of land is to be understood as done in order to the same: and consequently, whatsoever distribution he shall make in prejudice thereof is contrary to the will of every subject that committed his peace and safety to his discretion and conscience, and therefore by the will of every one of them is to be reputed void (Ibid: 153).

In short, private property in Hobbes’ theory is indeed the creation of the state. Similarly, the main reason why people cannot exercise real freedom in state of nature is based on the idea that without a sovereign power which can only be legitimate power as the first step to build civil society no one is insecure to exercise his freedom, even though he has his own property obtained by means of his own labour. Hence, the real freedom which Hobbes defines it as moral freedom can be exercised in civil society in which the right to property is secured by the sovereign as Oakeshott points out:

The law of property, comprehensively is the most important expression of the will of sovereign authority, because it is by this law that, each man coming to know what is his own and being protected in the enjoyment of it by the sovereign power, the most elementary form of the peace of civil society is established (Oakeshott, 1946: xii)

In short, as can be understood from the depictions of human nature and the state of nature, the question that Hobbes basically seeks to answer is how to establish a state as an order founder agency in which a rational individual with a selfish nature can live and exercise freedom in a definite secure place? In this regard, Hobbesian formulation about ideal relationship between individual, community and state in terms of exercising freedom linked to the private property needs a ‘Leviathanic’ order. In other words, Hobbes, as Benjamin Lopata notes, considers the sovereign as an institution which determines all property relations and individual freedoms (1973: 204). Hence, Leviathan as a founder of the order, private property and freedom are unavoidably concomitant in Hobbes’ social contract theory. Correspondingly, following the same logic, it can be said that in Hobbes’s theory the order-creating sovereign that emerges as the only absolute power in order to end state of war in the state of nature and to prevent people from returning to the state of nature is derived from individuals’ consent.

### **Reading Hobbesian Need of Order as a Social Formation in which the Tension between Private Property and Freedom is Lessened or Eliminated for the Sake of Proprietors**

In order to understand the relationship Hobbes wants to make between property, freedom, and order it is necessary to place Leviathan in its historical, social and material context. Above all, Hobbes witnesses the British Civil War and seeks ways to move from an anarchic-confrontational social formation to a secure order. To this aim, he lays the foundations of absolute political power to put an end to the social disarray of the British Civil War and the fragmentation of Medieval Europe. In the seventeenth century of England the struggle for the ownership of property on the means of production, as indicated in the first part of the article, was among one the main reasons of the British Civil War.

Accordingly, it has also underlined that the social changes caused by agrarian capitalism in seventeenth-century of England gave rise to the bourgeoisie revolution resulted in structural changes in the political and economic spectrums of British Society.

Hobbes, as discussed above, creates absolute power called Leviathan as the order-founder in his social contractarian theory to solve the tension between private property, order, and freedom. In this sense, one of the most fundamental issues of the discussion thus should be based on the question of 'is whether or not private property secured in the state of nature, while Hobbes attaches proprietary rights to the Leviathan?' The indirect answer to this question lays on the fact that the main reason why Hobbes associates property rights with liberty. In terms of exercising real freedom Hobbes, as discussed in previous section, argues that one can exist with what he has in civil society. In other words, the establishment of peace in civil society will be ensured by the state to secure what the person has as property. Thereof, by linking Leviathanic order with property rights to make individuals living in the state of nature transform into civil society for exercising their real freedom Hobbes uses social contract method as a tool for the sake of justifying inequalities stemmed from the emergence of capitalist relations. In doing so Hobbes tries to establish an order in which market freedom that leads to freedom of property owners is secured. He does it by developing four theoretical but strategic arguments in his description of the state of nature and especially of human nature.

First of all, the social contract theory nourished from the descriptions of hypothetical state of nature and eternal static human nature are methodologically designed according to the results Hobbes wants to achieve in his theory. In other words, by attributing eternal a-priori features to human nature Hobbes can be labelled as a theoretician who wants to obtain results he wants to achieve in the way of legitimating his contractarian order. Any static and free from any historical and social context-based descriptions of human nature do fall into contradiction with anthropological works, for many historical evidences indicated that the features and characters of human nature have been changed over centuries. Undoubtedly, it will be beyond the scope of this study to debate elaborately how Hobbesian descriptions of state of nature and eternal human nature is not proved by anthropological works. Yet, there are many anthropological works which maintenance the arguments of Eden and Morgan related to the anthropological examples which do refute Hobbesian understandings of state of nature and human nature. In this sense two quotations from the works of anthropologists concerning primitive communities in USA and Africa enable us to make some comments on Hobbesian hypothetical descriptions of state of nature and human nature:

[A]mong them, the land is as common as the sun and water: And... Mine and Thine (the seeds of all mischief) have no place with them. They are content with so little, that is so large a country, they have rather superfluity than scarceness. So that... they seem to live in the golden world, without toil, living in open gardens, not entrenched with dikes, divided with hedges, or defended with walls. They deal truly with one another, without laws, without books, and without judges (Eden, in Edward Arber, 1885: 78).

And;

(I)n circumstances of "savagery," the lowest step of human evolution, men knew no private property apart from in personal properties such as weapons and clothings. Land was held in common by the tribe and used for the benefit of all members of the community (Morgan, in Richard Pipes, 1999: 51).

Hobbesian theories of human nature and state of nature in this sense can be problematized in the sense that Hobbesian 'wolfish man' has appeared in a historical moment where capitalism emerged. That is; by describing human nature as wolfish and state of nature as state of war which cannot evidently be proved does not Hobbes formulate theoretical premises which reflect historical and material conditions of the agrarian capitalism, rather than reflecting universal state of nature and eternal static human nature? Therefore, description of human nature as if an eternal and free from any social and historical context is indeed a way of justifying basic features of human beings and state of nature that are shaped by the emergence of capitalism. In other words, methodologically describing the notions of human nature and state of nature in the way Hobbes formulates is not innocent. If it weren't so, then how would it be possible for a theoretician to legitimate a Mortal God like Leviathan as a founder of order? The following logical equation indicates why Hobbes justifies and formulates theoretical premises-no matter they are evidently/scientifically obtained- in order to reach Leviathan as an order founder of new capitalist social formation.

(P1): All people are selfish or homo homini lupus by nature

(P2): Wolfish men who live in society/nature in the absence of a state will be in constant war

Once taken these general pre-acceptances into consideration, it will be inevitable to reach one of the statements among many similar conclusions as follows:

(C1): Leviathan as order constructor is a legitimate power/need!

In the second place, his instrumental description of the notions of 'state of nature' and 'human nature' paves the way for establishing an order in which political rights are less important than economic rights. In Hobbes theory, the selfish and warlike character of human nature can be explained through individual possession on natural resources mostly on lands. In other words, the main reason for the conflict in the state of nature is based on the seizure of natural resources by powerful ones. In this context, in his work *De Cive* Hobbes argues that the main aim of individual both in state of nature and in civil society is "to have things to survive" (1949: 27). Hobbes in the same passage gives some other clues concerning the private property in the state of nature by saying that "the sovereign cannot be the sole legitimator of property relations if there exists private property prior to sovereignty" (Ibid). On this account, when it comes to property rights, Hobbes believes that one of the most fundamental tasks of the sovereign is to ensure an order in which individuals live in peace and to secure them not to be forced to return to the state of nature. In this respect, it can be said that one of the primary duties of the state/Leviathan emerged as a necessity to ensure the use of the private property as a right is to secure the property rights which individuals do not have in the state of nature. In short, individuals' goal in the state of nature in terms of surviving is to obtain power which can be realized through material resources, as Hobbes puts it; "The Power of a Man is his present means, to obtain some future apparent Good" and "Every man must always seek to have some power" (1997: 35). Under the light of these arguments answer of the question of 'why is human nature described as selfish and warlike in the state of nature?' can also be derived from Hobbes' own words: "every man, not only by Right but also by necessity of Nature, is supposed to endeavour all he can to obtain that which is necessary for his conservation" (Ibid: XV: 76). That is, the first aim of individual, according to Hobbes, is to possess the things on nature as far as he can, for they will give him the power to survive.

By linking the state of nature with human nature Hobbes formulates an order in which any possible threat related to infringing the rights of private property is prevented by Leviathan. In this context, what should be asked here is that 'what does cause insecurity in the state of nature?' Even though Hobbes's answer is based on one of the features that he attributed to human nature which is the principle of fear, his definition of human nature in a static way is an emphasis on the selfish and rational nature of human beings is directly related to that principle. That is, Hobbes describes the natural aspect of fear as a situation in which "fear of oppression, disposed a man to anticipate, to seek aid by society: for there is no other way by which a man can secure his life and liberty" (Ibid: XI: 49). Taking the fact that resources are scarce -especially during the eve of capitalism- within the context of an anarchic and warrior nature into consideration it is easier to understand why Hobbes defines human nature as selfish, greedy, aggressive, and fearful. The following example elucidates how Hobbesian theory formulates an order to eliminate the tension between private property and freedom for the benefit of property owner class. Let's return to the Hobbesian state of nature and consider that ensuring the livelihood of Person A in the case of a 50-meter square land to be fenced in the state of nature means preventing a possible seizure of Person B, Person C and Person D on the same land due to scarce resources in Hobbesian state of nature. That is, if Person A is more powerful than Person B, Person C, and Person D in terms of surviving, then Person B, Person C, and Person D theoretically have no chance to obtain the same land and possibly become a threat to Person A in terms of surviving. Hence, Hobbes's definition of Leviathan as the organizer of property relations means in a sense the legalization of existing private property when Person A transforms to the civil society. As for security, the same logic can be maintained. That is, since Person A has private property in civil society and Person B, Person C, and Person D do not, the possible threat in this condition will not come from Person A but come from Person B, Person C, and Person D to Person A. Therefore, in this situation security can only be important for owners of property, for propertyless people do not have anything to lose. The result that should be attained here is that; the person who has confiscated a natural resource (land, water, etc.) in the state of nature welcome to the Leviathanic legal order which can only legally guarantee his existing property in the state of nature when he transforms it to civil society.



In this context, the situation of the seventeenth century of British social classes in the Table B pointed out in the previous part of this chapter can easily indicate that why Hobbes establishes a secure order for the benefit of property owners as far as the number and social conditions of propertyless people is concerned.

Thirdly, Hobbesian formulation of property, freedom, and order which can also be directly related to the security of market freedom is about his description of instrumental reason and self-interested individuals which underlines early features of *homo oeconomicus* in capitalist social formation. The argument pointed out by Milton L. Myers in his book (1983) called *The Soul of Modern Economic Man: Ideas of Self-Interest, Thomas Hobbes to Adam Smith* which underlines Hobbesian understanding of individual's connection with the economic man model is important to mention here. Myers claims that Hobbes formulates a rational self-interested individual who always seeks to obtain the power to survive in the state of nature (p. 86). Myer's work depends on the idea that since Hobbes justifies the accumulation of property as a step to obtain power, Hobbesian formulation of the rational individual is directly connected to selfish nature of human being (p, 92). Even though Myer's contribution to analysing Hobbesian formulation of homo economics sounds plausible, his pure analysis of rationalism related to only power is inadequate to make a connection between the state of nature and civil society. In this regard, before everything else Hobbesian definition of reason explicitly underlines the instrumental aspect of it. He, in this sense, says that "Reason is nothing but Reckoning" (1997: 22) and maintains "Reason is the pace: Encrase of Science, the way: and the benefit of mankind, the end" (Ibid: 18). In Malcolmian words "for Hobbes, the mind calculates only the means and purpose of the individual interest" (Malcolm, 2005: 127). Such a formulation of reason ultimately needs to analyse with his theory of human nature and state of nature. So, the fact that man is an isolated person in the state of nature and just a person who uses his mind arises from the connection that Hobbes makes between reason and selfishness. Since an isolated person cannot find social aid to survive, he has only labour derived from reason or he can obtain natural resources utilizing brute force. In other words, in the state of nature, since the main goal of individuals is to survive, they have only chance to obtain the power to survive which enforces them to use their reason-based labour as an instrument to reach his ends or use brute force in order to obtain power for surviving. This logical end in Hobbes' theory stems from the selfish character of human nature and the reality of scarcity of natural resources.

Notably, as far the socio-economic conditions of seventeenth-century of England are considered it is not difficult to comprehend why Hobbes formulates rational individual in this way. Using brute force in Fencing Process was popular during the civil war in England as elaborately discussed in the first part of the study. As far as Hobbesian formulation is concerned it is clear to say that Hobbesian formulation is suitable to justify seizing any land to survive in the state of nature in this regard. For instance; suppose that William is a rational and self-interested person who lives in the state of nature and regards Alan as his competitor in terms of surviving in the same state of war. If William is more powerful than Alan, he can deprive Alan of fencing to say a 500 square meters agricultural land. Hence, in such a situation it is inevitable to establish a state that will secure a 500 square meter agricultural area to conserve it from any threat that may come from any more powerful person than William. In other words, one of the justifying arguments of the emergence of Leviathan as an order builder in Hobbes' theory is based on the idea that property owners no matter how they obtained property must have legal rights in civil society. Thereby, by applying rational self-interested feature of individual's condition in the state of nature to civil society, Hobbes entitled individuals with obeying the rules that secure their de-forced properties in the state of nature. That is, the *homo oeconomicus* feature of human nature is regarded by Hobbes as natural aspect of individual even though, it is an obligation for propertyless or weak individuals in terms of surviving in civil society to obey the rules of Leviathan as a sovereign power primary duty of which is to secure property rights from any threat that might ironically come from themselves. The table B discussed above thus explains how the majority of the society in England has deprived of their lands and became landless peasants and beggars in the cities which directly may be a threat to those owners of means of production, especially to those landowners. More importantly, it is vital here to ask the question of 'how should the freedom of propertyless who are rational and self-interested but do not have material power stemmed from property relations in civil society be formulated in Hobbes theory?' Hobbes' possible answer to this question would be pessimistic in that Hobbes normalizes labour as a mean which can be sold in the market. He argues that "for a man's labour also is a commodity exchangeable for benefit as well as any other thing" (1997: 130). However, in civil society where resources are scarce, a rational but dispossessed person who can sell only his labour are free provided that he serves it for the benefit of owners of means of production, as he plainly points out: "the means that conserve life are material property and the liberty to use it. It is suitable that the control of these means is pacific" (Ibid: XIII, 227).

Therefore, as far as the necessary link between property and freedom in Hobbes theory is concerned it is unsurprising to say that Hobbes' definition of property and freedom have an exclusive aspect in that due to the fact that the right of an ownership of a property necessarily excludes others, freedom of owners of means of production depends on how many propertyless people are dependence. That is, for Hobbes, an individual who is able to calculate his own interests but do not have power except his labour let alone being free he is already in danger of extinction when he does not obey the rules of the competitive environment of the capitalist market. In short, one can be rational and self-interested except free in Hobbesian formulation of civil society. In a nutshell, one should be free to increase his ownership in a competitive environment and in a market where security is established by Leviathan main duty of which is to prevent any threat against market security that may possibly come from propertyless people.

Lastly, Hobbes justifies an early version of the capitalist market through his economic model. The argument put forward by Jesus M. Zaratiegui Labiano (2000) who reads Leviathan with economists' glasses in this sense enables us to clarify main points of Leviathan that founds main elements of the early capitalist market. Labiano, in short, argues that Hobbes "uses a model that can only correspond to a mercantile society of capitalist character, in which political rights are less important than security in the market" (p, 134). Accordingly, Labiano strengthens his argument by claiming that 'rationalization of selfishness' and 'competitive and warlike' descriptions of human nature in the state of nature in Hobbes theory indeed is a reflection of features of the seventeenth century capitalist market in England. The main necessity of civil society in Hobbes theory thus based on the idea that "if there is no market economy, there is no society" (p, 141). Hence, Hobbes in his social contract theory describes the birth of a market for everything scarce and the scarceness incited by the aspiration of all men to have more things entails some type of institutional resolution in the name of Leviathan which founds basic principles of the capitalist market (Ibid). Labiano's argument on Leviathan makes sense. As discussed above one of the main goals of sovereign is not only to conserve property and legalize it in civil society but also to prevent any threat which may infringe individual free initiative to use his rational self-interests in economic sphere. Hobbes puts it as follows: "the validity of covenants begins not but with the Constitution of a Civil Power, sufficient to compel men to keep them: and then it is also that Property begins" (1997: 72). Therefore, selfish, rational, and competitive individual formulated by Hobbes in the state of nature is a typical businessman that capitalist market needs. The competitive atmosphere of the capitalist market and inequalities stemmed from the property-based economic model are particularly justified by Hobbes in that "if all things were equally in all men, nothing would be priced" (Ibid: VIII: 32). Likewise, the inequalities concerning economic freedom in the society that stemmed from the private property-based mode of production are first secured in Leviathanic order in which political rights are of secondary importance. In other words, the endless desire of human beings in state of nature is reflected as endless desire of wolfish homo economicus for profit which accelerates the process of accumulation of capital in 'Macphersonian sense'<sup>4</sup> to obtain power for the sake of exercising freedom in the market where freedom of property owners are secured and freedom of propertyless people are reduced to a kind of freedom of choice in terms of supplying their own labour.

## Conclusion

The points discussed above indicate that the social contract theory developed by Hobbes justifies a strong monarch as order founder, for Hobbes does not believe that the social confusion and antagonisms stemmed from the emergence of new productive relations, namely relations emerged from agrarian capitalism, would be solved by the parliament. Rather than the traditional monarchy whose power is justified through blood and ancestry ties, Hobbesian formulation of monarchy obtains its legitimacy from reason-based natural laws and is equipped with civil laws derived from natural laws that are free from traditional laws and functional in ensuring the security of the capitalist market.

Methodologically speaking, it can be said that the definition of a universal static human nature as if ruptured from historical and social realities and the description of the historically unexperienced state of nature are used in Hobbes' theory in order to justify Leviathanic capitalist order. By using such methodological steps Hobbes does try to eliminate or alleviate class-based antagonisms through building a Leviathanic order in order to justify the results he wants to obtain in terms of justifying artificial/economic inequalities under the name of formal equalities and freedoms.

Moreover, his descriptive analysis of human nature and state of nature enables him to base liberal capitalist order in that his adjectives attributed to a liberal understanding of individual and to the market economy such as self-interest, rational and competitive not only underline the main features of homo economicus but also do emphasize and legitimate wolfish nature of capitalist market.

More importantly, Hobbesian formulation of freedom and order is directly based on the idea of private property in that individuals, whose aim is to survive, utilize obtaining power, namely property, both in state of nature and civil society are regarded as only subjects of exercising freedom. In this sense, Hobbes theoretically formulates and justifies the freedom of landless and beggar groups which are major social groups of seventeenth-century of England as free to sell their labour as a commodity in the market. Hence, in Hobbes's contractarian theory the questions of (I) why do people who are rational and self-interest but do not have enough power to seize land in a world where resources are scarce participate in or become part of social covenant?; (II) why do parties who are propertyless or landless accept a Leviathanic order in which freedom is exercised in a market economy where they can only sell their labour as a grace of their (un)freedom/dependence?; or (III) why do propertyless people consent to covenant in which they feel Leviathanic stick on their head if they do not obey the rules that strictly secure landowners' economic rights in the market economy?; and lastly (IV) why do people who became jobless and landless due to fencing process consent to covenant in which the freedom of parties who use brute force in fencing process in terms of primitive accumulation of capital process is secured by means of so-called civillaws? indicate Hobbesian need of a contractarian order in which the tension between private property and freedom is formulated for the sake of owners of means of production against propertyless masses.

## Notes

1. According to the Filmer's argument, all the kings on the earth have received authority from Adam and are equipped with holy rights. Just as Adam was the father of all mankind, kings are the fathers of the societies that is why the legitimacy of royal power is based on blood and ancestry ties. Interestingly, another important reason that differentiates Hobbes from the classical absolutist mentality is that Hobbes has developed the idea that the individual can have private property in civil society. Because the ideas of the proponents of classical monarchy, especially Robert Filmer, were similar to those of the legitimacy of power. In this context, ownership was a right granted to the king by God, and the king had divine powers to seize all property when he wanted it. (Hobbes, 1985: 17, 29-32).
2. The data used in the table are obtained from the following source: Michel Beaud (2001) *A History of Capitalism, 1500-2000*, translated by Tom Dickman and Anny Lefebvre, New York: Monthly Review Press, pp: 29.
3. As Pounds
4. As Pounds
5. The word "homo homini lupus" which means that man is man's a wolf in Latin language was used for the first time by the Roman poet and playwright Titus Macchius Plautus who lived in the third century BC. Interestingly; despite the fact that this Latin phrase is often used by scholars in order to refer Hobbesian formulation of man in state of nature is not used in Leviathan.
6. Crawford Macpherson argues that Hobbes is not concerned much about political theory rather he does focus on just economic principles of new emerged capitalism. He writes that "Hobbes did not "do" political arithmetic a la Petty, much less political economy a la Smith. He did however, "set down a few general economic principles... (such as) a supply and demand theory of Exchange value (1962: 64). He also recommended several policies all "designed to increase the wealth of the nation by promoting the accumulation of capital by private enterprises." In fine, Hobbes viewed it as "the job of the state . . . to clear the for capitalism," and his theory of political obligation provided "the legitimation of the early capitalist state" (Machperson, in Taylor, 2010: 423)

**TABLE A: ‘Social Classes and Monthly Incomes in England between 1600 and 1650’.<sup>5</sup>**

Classes	The Number of Family (Approximately)	‘Monthly Income of A Family’ <sup>6</sup> (Approximately)	‘Total Income’ <sup>7</sup> (Approximately)
Lords	186	2590	481.800
Traders (Maritime)	2000	400	800.000
Traders (Land)	8000	200	1.600.000
Landowner Farmers	40.000	84	3.360.000
Merchants and Shopkeepers	40.000	45	1.800.000
Landless Peasants	400.000	6.10	2.600.000
Beggars	30.000	2	60.000

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